MAGA’s Momentum: How Populism Redefined Power in America
Populism’s challenge to the establishment: A battle for the future.
Donald Trump’s overwhelming victory wasn’t just an ordinary election – it was a statement from millions of Americans that the systems they’ve trusted for decades aren’t working anymore. America has officially entered a populist era. And I believe that for the next decade or possibly more, populism will dominate our politics, culture and national identity as a whole.
Populism extends far beyond Trump. It represents a broader phenomenon driven by widespread frustration with economic stagnation, growing distrust in traditional institutions, and the pervasive feeling that ordinary people have been overlooked.
Populist movements gain momentum when democratic systems fail to fulfill their promises, creating opportunities for challengers to disrupt the status quo. The "establishment"—encompassing political leaders, cultural influencers, media, and educational institutions—has struggled to address the pressing concerns of working-class Americans. This disconnect has left room for movements like MAGA to resonate, particularly by speaking directly to those who feel excluded.
Before and during the election, many Americans watched the Democratic Party’s internal maneuvers with a growing sense of disillusionment. What should have been a democratic process to select their next leader felt more like the workings of an exclusive club, shielding its decisions from public scrutiny.
The behind-the-scenes effort to push Joe Biden aside—spearheaded by establishment figures like Nancy Pelosi, Barack Obama, and even George Clooney—came across as a calculated power play rather than a principled transition.
The orchestrated coronation of Kamala Harris, conducted with the full backing of cheerleading media outlets and without any semblance of an open contest, only deepened the unease. This all led Americans, who were constantly told that Democrats stood as champions of democracy, to view such claims as increasingly insincere.
Adding to the disconnect were cringeworthy attempts to mimic the grassroots energy of the MAGA movement, such as the rollout of camouflage Harris/Walz caps and "White Dudes for Harris" slogans, which underscored just how out of touch party leaders had become with the realities and sentiments of everyday Americans.
As the Democratic Party began to sense defeat on the horizon, their messaging took a desperate and alienating turn. Women, in particular, were targeted with guilt-driven appeals, including commercials that bizarrely encouraged them to deceive their husbands about their vote.
Meanwhile, cable news became saturated with DNC operatives pushing the narrative that casting a ballot for Kamala Harris was not just a political choice but a moral obligation—a selfless act to “save America” and preserve decency. These tactics, far from inspiring, only served to highlight the party’s growing disconnect from voters and their struggles.
Ironically, it was the Democratic Party that most Americans came to view as increasingly out of touch, and yes -- weird, as it embraced extreme positions on gender, identity, and crime.
The contrast with the Democrats of the 1990s couldn’t have been starker. Back then, the party championed immigration control, a tough-on-crime stance, union jobs, and social programs that directly benefited American workers.
By 2024, however, the Democrats seemed to prioritize niche issues—an obsessive focus on gender and race, billions of taxpayer dollars sent overseas, protections for illegal migrants, and criminal justice policies that catered to a tiny minority of offenders while ignoring the safety concerns of the broader public. This sharp shift left many voters feeling alienated, as the party appeared more concerned with ideological posturing than addressing the everyday struggles of most Americans.
Trump’s landslide victory was not just a historic political win. It was the result of years of growing national dissatisfaction, which was never addressed as a legitimate concern in the halls of elite institutions.
While the Harris campaign continually attempted to convince the American people that the Republicans were “just plain weird,” and “fascists,” and that the economy was actually in great condition, with promises of “joy” – Trump’s campaign directly and frankly addressed the issues of immigration, inflation, and crime. His campaign spoke to people who felt disconnected from the political establishment, offering a simple, direct message: the elites have failed you, and I’m here to fight for you. That’s the heart of populism—"the people" against "the elite." Trump’s appeal lies in his ability to bypass traditional intermediaries and communicate directly with voters, a hallmark of populist leaders worldwide (Urbinati, Political Theory of Populism, pp. 112-113).
One of the most striking shifts in the 2024 election was the collapse of legacy media’s influence. Cable news and major newspapers used to shape public opinion, and they had the trust of the American people. Not anymore.
Americans are tuning into podcasts, following independent influencers, and engaging with decentralized online platforms. Traditional outlets are no longer gatekeepers of information. They are becoming irrelevant.
This shift is both technological and ideological. People don’t want to be told what to think by institutions they no longer trust. Nadia Urbinati explains that populist movements often bypass traditional hierarchies to communicate directly with the public, fostering a sense of intimacy and authenticity (Urbinati, pp. 115-116).
Platforms like YouTube and Substack allow leaders—and even ordinary citizens—to bypass institutional filters and speak directly to audiences. At the end of the day, Americans want to control how they access information, just as they want more control over their political and economic systems.
If there’s one issue fueling populism more than any other, it’s the economy. Inflation, low wages, and rising living costs are hitting Americans hard. Many are juggling multiple side jobs just to stay afloat.
Meanwhile, they see billions of dollars going overseas—to Ukraine, Israel, or other foreign aid programs—and they wonder why those resources aren’t being spent here. This frustration is a key driver of the "America First" ideology that underpins modern populism.
The migrant crisis has also become a focal point. For many Americans, the influx of migrants—and the resources spent addressing it—feels like a government prioritizing others over its own citizens. Sheri Berman notes that populist anger often grows when there’s a perception that government actions are disconnected from people’s real struggles (Berman, pp. 74-75).
Crime has become one of the most contentious issues in American politics, turning urban violence into a rallying cry for law and order—a cornerstone of populist rhetoric. Leaders who promise to crack down on crime aren’t just addressing public safety; they’re appealing to a deeper frustration with systems that feel fundamentally broken.
For years under Biden, many Americans witnessed a stark erosion of accountability, especially in major cities where shoplifters could walk into stores, fill garbage bags with stolen goods, and leave without fear of intervention. Security guards stood powerless, reflecting policies that seemed to prioritize leniency over justice. To many, this wasn’t just a failure of governance—it was a blatant disregard for fairness, further cementing the perception that the system was rigged against law-abiding citizens.
Populism isn’t just about anger or frustration—it’s also about empowerment. Technology has played a huge role in this shift. The internet, social media, and cryptocurrencies have given people tools to bypass traditional gatekeepers, whether those are governments, banks, or media companies.
Cryptocurrencies, in particular, have become a symbol of resistance against centralized control. Urbinati observes that populist movements often embrace decentralization as a way to reclaim agency. For a growing number of Americans, crypto represents freedom from government manipulation and corporate greed (Urbinati, pp. 115-116).
This same spirit of empowerment is driving changes in how Americans interact with politics and society. Crowdfunding, online activism, and decentralized networks are giving people a sense of agency they’ve long felt was missing.
What makes this populist moment particularly interesting is how it’s affecting both parties. While populism has energized conservatives, it’s also creating tensions within the Democratic Party. There’s a growing divide between establishment Democrats and a younger, more populist faction pushing for economic justice and grassroots activism.
Berman has written about how populism tends to disrupt traditional party structures, forcing them to adapt—or risk irrelevance (Berman, pp. 77-78). That’s exactly what’s happening to the Democrats now. The party’s technocratic solutions and focus on identity politics are alienating many voters who feel those priorities don’t address their real concerns. Unless Democrats can find a way to incorporate populist energy into their platform, they may struggle to stay competitive in this new era.
So far, it seems the Democratic Party has taken few lessons from their 2024 defeat. Rather than addressing voters’ concerns head-on or acknowledging the extremity of some of their positions, they’ve opted instead to mimic the strategies of the populist right—without understanding the deeper forces driving its success.
A case in point is the criticism Kamala Harris received for avoiding platforms like The Joe Rogan Experience, a decision many view as symbolic of her campaign’s inability to connect with ordinary voters. Trump’s appearance on Rogan’s podcast—a three-hour conversation that garnered over 100 million views across platforms, including 50 million on YouTube alone—demonstrated the power of reaching people where they are, without filters.
Now, in December 2024, some Democrats are calling to “build their own Joe Rogan.” Legal commentator Elie Mystal summed up this sentiment on X (formerly Twitter):
“Liberals need to BUILD THEIR OWN JOE ROGAN. Somebody who can speak to the people he speaks to, without being a guy who wants to kiss ass to billionaires like Elon Musk.”
But here’s the problem: you can’t manufacture authenticity, and you certainly can’t recreate a grassroots cultural movement that thrives on rejecting the very establishment the Democrats represent.
What makes the populist right culturally significant is not just its politics—it’s its ability to create a broad and dynamic subculture filled with memes, humor, and the unfiltered exchange of ideas. It’s a space where norms and traditions are questioned, mocked, and reimagined, often outside the constraints of "polite" society. Platforms like Rogan’s resonate because they embrace controversy and open dialogue, providing room for unconventional perspectives that challenge the status quo.
If the left wants its own version of Joe Rogan, it would need to shed the very constraints that define its current identity. That would mean fostering an environment where people can speak freely, even when their opinions run counter to progressive orthodoxy.
But this is a near-impossible task given the grip of the party’s most hardcore base, which enforces ideological purity with relentless social pressure. The fear of cancellation, online ridicule, or outright ostracism stifles open dialogue and ensures that even mild dissent remains off-limits.
Until the left loosens its own reins, it will struggle to replicate the cultural force of the populist right. Authentic grassroots movements can’t be conjured in think tanks or PR firms; they emerge organically, fueled by a shared rejection of the establishment and a willingness to embrace the unpredictable. That’s a freedom the modern left, as it stands today, seems unwilling or unable to allow.
So, where does this leave us? Populism isn’t a passing trend. The economic, cultural, and technological forces fueling it are far too entrenched to fade away anytime soon. For at least the next decade, MAGA-style populism will shape the political landscape, forcing even its detractors to adopt more moderate or people-focused positions in response.
The question is not whether populism will endure—it’s what form it will take. Will it inspire greater democratic engagement and accountability, or will it deepen polarization and tribalism? Will it empower everyday citizens, or will it be exploited by opportunistic leaders who claim to speak for "the people" while pursuing their own agendas? These uncertainties will define America’s populist moment and its legacy.
One thing is clear: the old playbook no longer works. If 2024 has taught us anything, it’s that Americans are demanding something new—new voices, new ideas, and new ways of governing. Institutions that wish to survive and remain relevant must adapt. That means welcoming a broader range of perspectives and dismantling the rigid hierarchies of ideological purity and social signaling that currently dominate. Leaders within these institutions will need to embrace change, stop denouncing divergent ideas as threats to their positions, and engage with a public that no longer trusts the old guard. If they fail to do so, these institutions will continue to wither, becoming irrelevant and, eventually, obsolete.
The decade ahead—and the four years ahead—are ripe with challenges. The establishment won’t simply surrender its power; no entrenched system does. It still maintains a strong grip on many of the country’s most influential structures. The real struggle lies in the tug-of-war between the establishment clinging to its relevance and the populist tide demanding accountability and reform.
In time, even this populist movement will face its own reckoning. All orthodoxies, no matter how revolutionary at their start, tend to calcify when they become the new establishment. For now, however, populism is not merely a reaction to years of perceived betrayal, dishonesty, and institutional failure—it is a force poised to reshape American politics, society, and culture for years to come. Whether that leads to renewal or further division remains an open question. What’s certain is that the tide cannot be turned back.
References
· Urbinati, N. (2019). Political theory of populism. Annual Review of Political Science, 22(1), 111–127. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070753
· Berman, S. (2021). The causes of populism in the West. Annual Review of Political Science, 24(1), 71–88. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-102503